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We investigate the impact of domestic financial frictions on the current account
dynamics in Asian countries before and after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998
by introducing collateral constraints into the intertemporal current account approach.
We examine six Asian countries. Before the crisis, collateral constraints significantly
impact the current account in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, but
after the crisis, they do not. Our study shows that the impact of domestic financial
frictions on the current account changes before and after a financial crisis. (JEL F32,
F41)
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I INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, the importance of financial frictions has drawn attention
from many researchers aiming to understand macroeconomic phenomena such as economic
growth and business cycles.1 Despite such attention from researchers, however, few studies
have conducted statistical testing to determine whether macroeconomic models with financial
frictions can actually be applied to real economies.2 In this paper, by developing a small open
economy version of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model following Kasa (1998), we derive a
closed-form solution for the current account dynamics. By using only macroeconomic data,
we directly estimate the closed-form solution to examine the performance of the Kiyotaki and
Moore model in six Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Thailand.
Many Asian and Latin American countries experienced financial crises in the mid-1990s.
The six Asian countries that we study had a devastating financial crisis in 1997-1998 (the
Asian financial crisis). According to Bernanke (2005), it is highly likely that the pattern
for the current account dynamics in many Asian and Latin American countries changed in
the mid-1990s. Before the crisis, they had been net capital importers, but they became
net capital exporters after the crisis. The change in the current account positions of these
countries in the mid-1990s is one of the causes driving global imbalances in the 2000s. As
such, it is important to analyze the determinants of the current account dynamics in Asian
countries. However, few empirical studies focus on collateral constraints as a determinant of
1Many researchers have emphasized financial frictions as an important factor in understanding macroe-
conomic phenomena. In the literature on finance and economic growth, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion
et al. (2005), among others, theoretically demonstrate that relaxing financial frictions promotes economic
growth. In the literature on business cycles and financial frictions, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), and Pintus and Wen (2013) study the financial accelerator
mechanism and investigate how and how much the eﬀects of productivity shocks on macroeconomic activities
are amplified. Moreover, Matsuyama (2007, 2013), Kikuchi (2008), Kikuchi and Stachurski (2009), Kunieda
and Shibata (2011, 2014), and Myerson (2012) derive endogenous business fluctuations caused by financial
frictions.
2There are many studies that evaluate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models with
financial frictions by calibrating them and comparing their first and second order moments with the actual
data.
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the current account.3 In addition to examining the performance of the Kiyotaki and Moore
model in the six Asian countries, we investigate whether the impact of domestic collateral
constraints on the current account changed from before and to after the Asian financial crisis
by applying the closed-form solution.
Our empirical results from the six Asian countries show that among these six countries,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand show an almost identical structural change
with respect to the impact of collateral constraints on the current account at the time of
the financial crisis: only before the crisis do collateral constraints in these four countries
significantly impact the current account; after the crisis, they do not. This outcome implies
that the Kiyotaki and Moore model can be applied to these four countries before the crisis.
Our basic theoretical model is deterministic: no stochastic shocks aﬀect production func-
tions. In the closed-form solution, if an economy does not face a collateral constraint, the
current account is only determined by the one-period-lagged current account, the first diﬀer-
ence in net output, and the first diﬀerence in foreign reserves. However, if an economy faces
a collateral constraint, the one-period-lagged first diﬀerence in private credit also aﬀects the
current account. If the coeﬃcient of the one-period-lagged first diﬀerence in private credit
is significantly negative, an economy faces a collateral constraint and Kiyotaki and Moore’s
(1997) model can be applied to the economy.
Although the closed-form solution for the current account in the deterministic model is
simple, an economy may be subject to stochastic productivity shocks. Therefore, we ex-
tend the deterministic model to a stochastic version by introducing an aggregate shock in
the production technology and derive a closed-form solution for the current account in the
stationary state, in which all variables exhibit stationary distributions. As in the determin-
istic model, if an economy does not face a collateral constraint, the current account is only
determined by the aforementioned three factors. In contrast with the deterministic model,
however, if an economy faces a collateral constraint, the current period first diﬀerence in
3Notable exceptions are Kasa (1998) and Kunieda and Shibata (2005) as discussed in section VI.
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private credit negatively aﬀects the current account in addition to the other three determi-
nants.4 The estimation results from the stochastic closed-form solution are almost the same
as those obtained from the deterministic closed-form solution.
Corsetti et al. (1999) document the causes of the Asian financial crisis. In their study,
there are three key concepts that characterize the eve of the financial crisis: overlending, cur-
rent account imbalances, and the maturity structure of capital inflows. According to their
study, the fragile banking and financial systems in Asian countries led to overlending booms
in these countries prior to the financial crisis. For example, in Thailand, although govern-
ment regulation limited the credit provision of traditional commercial banks, unregulated
nonbank financial intermediaries, which had emerged after the financial liberalization of the
1990s, circumvented credit limits. Furthermore, a tax deduction incentivized these nonbank
financial intermediaries to commit to oﬀshore borrowing. As a result, these intermediaries
substantially expanded their lending to the real estate sector, primarily financed by oﬀshore
borrowing.5 Massive capital inflows in Asian countries due to the large expansion of oﬀshore
borrowing induced large current account deficits. Under these circumstances, there was a
double misalignment problem in these countries in which unproductive domestic long-term
investment projects were financed by short-term borrowing with a foreign currency. For-
eign lenders with short lending maturity anticipated the failure of unproductive investment
projects and the insolvency of these countries and therefore refused to renew lending, causing
the Asian financial crisis.
Given the numerous capital inflows and overlending to these countries, one might raise
a natural question: did borrowers in Asian countries really face collateral constraints? Al-
though we investigate this question in this paper using macroeconomic data, there are some
4If considering an identity of the current account, one might argue that it is obvious that the current
period first diﬀerence in private credit negatively aﬀects the current account; however, the closed-form
solution derived from the stochastic model is not an identity of the current account, and productivity shocks
in the stationary state change the constrained borrowers’ behavior in terms of consumption and investment
in land, which aﬀects the current account through the financial markets.
5Corsetti et al. (1999) provide evidence for the stock market prices of the property sector that is consistent
with speculative overinvestment in land and real estate in Asian countries during the 1990-1996 period; this
overinvestment boosted land and real estate prices. See Table 11 in Corsetti et al. (1999).
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pieces of microeconomic evidence indicating that borrowers faced collateral constraints be-
fore the financial crisis. Using banking data covering the period 1992-1996, Menkhoﬀ et
al. (2006) provide evidence showing that collateral-based lending is prevalent in Thailand.
Similarly, using firm level data, Charumilind et al. (2006) reveal that not only relationship
lending but also collateral-based lending were present in long-term loan contracts in Thailand
before the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, Driﬃeld and Pal (2001) investigate firm level
data during the 1989-1997 period for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand and find
evidence suggesting that smaller firms in these countries were credit constrained.6 Although
using microeconomic data, as done in these studies, appears to be suitable for addressing
whether the private sector suﬀers from collateral constraints, we would incur a great cost if
we examined many countries using microeconomic data for each and it appears to be impos-
sible to investigate the eﬀect of collateral constraints on the current account dynamics using
microeconomic data. Given this situation, our simple macroeconomic estimation merits ap-
plication to examine whether an economy faces collateral constraints, and it complements
the microeconomic estimations performed by the aforementioned studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
a dynamic general equilibrium model and derive an estimable closed-form current account
solution. In section III, we describe the data, and in section IV, we obtain the estimation
results for the six Asian countries. In section V, we extend the deterministic model derived
in section II to a stochastic model and obtain estimation results similar to those in section
IV. In section VI, we discuss the related literature. We provide our concluding remarks in
section VII.
II Model
6Although they do not explicitly examine the presence of collateral-based lending, they find evidence for
credit constraints in these countries. According to Berger and Udell (2002), there are at least four primary
lending technologies for financial intermediaries–financial statement lending, asset-based lending, credit
scoring, and relationship lending. These four lending technologies are not mutually exclusive in a country,
and collateral constraints relate to asset-based lending. These four lending technologies are institutional,
meaning that they have been developed over the years, and thereby, if asset-based lending is one of the
primary lending technologies causing credit constraints in Asian countries, the massive capital inflows and
overlending on the eve of the financial crisis must be associated with collateral constraints.
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The structure of the model economy is based on Kunieda and Shibata (2005), which is
an extension of Kasa (1998). A country is assumed to be a small open economy facing
a world interest rate. The economy consists of savers and borrowers. As in Kiyotaki and
Moore’s (1997) model, the borrowers are collaterally constrained. The total population in the
economy is normalized to one, and the ratio of borrowers to savers is λ:1−λ, where λ ∈ (0, 1)
is a constant. All of the borrowers are identical in that they have the same preference
and technology. Similarly, all of the savers are identical in these two characteristics. The
instantaneous utility functions of both savers and borrowers are assumed to be identical;
specifically, these are given by ln c∗t and ln ct, where c
∗
t and ct are the consumption of a saver
and of a borrower, respectively.
Savers
Each saver is endowed with two types of production technologies. While both of the produc-
tion technologies create a consumption good, their inputs are diﬀerent. One uses land (x∗)
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0, and G1(0) = 0. The other technology uses capital (k
∗) as input, and the production func-




where G02 > 0, and G
00
2 < 0. G2 also satisfies the Inada conditions. Because each saver is






where we note that production takes one gestation period. A saver with a discount factor
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βt ln c∗t (1)
s.t. c∗t + qt(x
∗
t − x∗t−1) + I∗t + Rb∗t−1
= (1− τ)[G1(x∗t−1) +G2(k∗t−1)] + b∗t , (2)
where I∗t = k
∗
t − (1 − δ)k∗t−1; b∗t is debt if positive or assets if negative; qt is the land price;
and R is the gross world interest rate, which is constant and assumed to be greater than
one. Eq. (1) is the saver’s lifetime utility, and Eq. (2) is his flow budget constraint. Note
that the government imposes an income tax to finance its spending and purchase of foreign
reserves in each period, and τ is a constant tax rate, which is exogenously determined by
the government.
The first-order conditions for the saver are given by the following:




(1− τ)G02(k∗t ) = R + δ − 1, (5)
where ut = qt − qt+1/R. Eq. (3) is the Euler equation, and Eqs. (4) and (5) are the intra-
temporal optimality conditions in the land and capital markets, respectively.7 The necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the optimality of this maximization problem consist of Eqs. (3)-
(5) as well as the transversality condition. It is noted that k∗t is constant throughout all time
periods, whereas x∗t varies according to the land price.
Borrowers
Each borrower is endowed with a linear production technology, yt+1 = axt that takes land as
7To be accurate, to ensure that all savers remain savers over their lifetimes, the assets that they hold in
the steady state (−bˆ∗) must be greater than zero. As seen later, −bˆ∗ is given by −bˆ∗=[δkˆ∗−(1−τ)(G1(xˆ∗)+
G2(kˆ
∗))]/(R−1), where xˆ∗ = G0−11 (Rβa) and kˆ∗ = G0−12 ((R+δ−1)/(1−τ)) are the land and capital stocks,
respectively, held by a saver in the steady state. We impose parameter conditions so that −bˆ∗ > 0.
7
its input.8 Here, a, xt, and yt+1 represent a constant productivity parameter, land held by
the borrower at time t, and her output at time t+1, respectively. While a borrower borrows
resources from the financial market, she faces a credit constraint associated with the value
of the collateral in each period. Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), technical conditions
are imposed on the parameters:
a > Rβa > G01
¡
(1− Rβ)X¯/(1− λ)¢ , (6)
where X¯ is the total amount of land. Through Eq. (6), we exclude economically meaningless
solutions from the model.




βt ln ct (7)
s.t. ct + qt(xt − xt−1) + Rbt−1 = (1− τ)axt−1 + bt, (8)
bt ≤ R−1qt+1xt, (9)
where Eqs. (8) and (9) represent the flow budget constraint and the credit constraint,
respectively, and again τ is the constant tax rate imposed on her income. The online appendix
demonstrates that there exists time T such that from time T onward, the credit constraints
given by Eq. (9) are always binding. Henceforth, we focus on a case where the credit
constraints are always binding.





− φt = 0 (10)
−qt
ct
+ β[(1− τ)a+ qt+1] 1
ct+1
+ R−1qt+1φt = 0, (11)
8For simplicity, it is assumed that each borrower is endowed with only one production technology that
takes land as its input. One can imagine that while each borrower could access another production technology
that is linear with respect to capital, when the borrowers use this technology, its productivity would be
extremely low compared to the world interest rate.
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where φt is a co-state variable of the credit constraint at time t. The necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the optimality of this maximization problem consist of Eqs. (10) and (11) as
well as the transversality condition.
Government
As in Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011), we introduce foreign reserves into the current model
because the build-up of foreign reserves after the Asian financial crisis is an important factor
determining the current account dynamics.9 We assume that the tax revenue collected by
the government is used for public spending and the purchase of foreign currencies. The
government runs a balanced budget in each period, and the government budget constraint
is given by
τ [λyt + (1− λ)y∗t ] = gt + FRt − R× FRt−1, (12)
where gt and FRt are government spending and foreign reserves, respectively. We assume
that the interest rate on foreign reserves is the same as the world interest rate. Government
spending (gt) is exogenously determined by the government.
Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this small open economy with world interest rate R is expressed
by sequences of a land price, {qt+1}, and allocation, {(c∗t , ct), (x∗t , xt), (b∗t , bt), kt} for t ≥ 0, so
that the savers’ and borrowers’ optimization conditions hold, and the land market clears.10
The saver’s lifetime utility is log-linear, and thus his optimal consumption is derived as
follows:




where πt = (1/R)((1− τ)y∗t+1 − I∗t+1)− utx∗t .
9Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011) derive the optimal level of foreign reserves and suggest that the recent
build-up of foreign reserves in emerging Asian economies exceeds the level required by an insurance motive
against sudden stops. We do not consider the optimal level of foreign reserves in the current model.
10As demonstrated by Kunieda and Shibata (2005), an equilibrium exists and is uniquely determined
under the parameter conditions assumed in Eq. (6).
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Because Eq. (9) is binding, the budget constraint of a borrower, Eq. (8), is reduced to
ct + utxt = (1− τ)axt−1. (14)





From Eqs. (14) and (15), the borrower’s optimal consumption is obtained as follows:
ct = (1− β)[(1− τ)axt−1 + qtxt−1 −Rbt−1] = (1− β)(1− τ)axt−1. (16)
Proposition 1
Suppose that xˆ is the land held by borrowers in the steady state, and Z, a so-called net
output, is defined by the output minus the sum of investment and government spending.
Then, the closed-form solution for the current account dynamics around the steady state of
the economy is given as follows:
CAt = βR CAt−1 + (1− β)∆FRt + β∆Zt − (1− β)Ψλxˆ∆PCt−1, (17)
where CA, PC, and Ψ are the current account, private credit, and a positive constant,
respectively, and ∆ represents the first diﬀerence in the variable.
Proof: See the online appendix.
Eq. (17) is directly estimable. Although Eq. (17) has a similar form to Eq. (22)
in Kunieda and Shibata (2005), we note a key diﬀerence between them. In Eq. (22) in
Kunieda and Shibata (2005), the first diﬀerence in land prices has a negative impact on the
current account, whereas ∆PCt−1 has a negative impact on the current account in our newly
derived solution (17). Additionally, the right-hand side of Eq. (17) incorporates the first
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diﬀerence in foreign reserves; this point is also absent in Eq. (22) in Kunieda and Shibata
(2005).
Intuitively, the production resources are ineﬃciently allocated if the agents in the econ-
omy are collaterally constrained. More concretely, less land is allocated to borrowers and
more to savers in our model compared to an economy with a perfect financial market. In the
current model economy, if the collateral constraints are relaxed at time t− 1 due to antici-
pation of an increase in land prices, constrained borrowers will increase their borrowing and
their investment in land. Accordingly, production ineﬃciency is corrected, and the aggregate
production in the entire economy will increase at time t. The increase in production leads
to an increase in total savings for the entire economy, which positively aﬀects the current
account. The term β∆Zt in Eq. (17) reflects this eﬀect.
The reallocation of land from unconstrained agents to constrained agents that is induced
by the relaxation of the collateral constraints does not aﬀect the consumption behavior of
the unconstrained agents. There is no eﬀect because their investment in the land market
and savings in the credit market are perfect substitutes in their consumption smoothing.
Therefore, the Euler equation, Eq. (3), is not subject to the land price. Without technological
shocks to aﬀect the agents’ permanent income, the reallocation of land does not aﬀect the
consumption of unconstrained agents. In contrast, the consumption behavior of constrained
agents is aﬀected by land prices, as observed in Eq. (15). As land prices increase, each
constrained agent’s consumption increases as well. Due to credit constraints, investment in
the land market and savings in the credit market are not perfect substitutes. It is better
for constrained agents to increase borrowing and invest more in land because their marginal
revenue involving an increase in land prices is greater than the market interest rate. Then,
their consumption smoothing is subject to land prices even if no technological shocks occur
that aﬀect their permanent income. As a consequence, the aggregate consumption in the
entire economy increases as land prices increase. This phenomenon is reflected in the last
term of Eq. (17), which negatively aﬀects the current account.
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Note that the increment in foreign reserves has a positive eﬀect on the current account
in Eq. (17). This eﬀect results from agents’ consumption and saving behavior, which in
turn is aﬀected by the government’s behavior. In this sense, this positive eﬀect on the
current account represents an indirect impact because the direct increase in foreign reserves
is already counted in the current account.
Constrained borrowers exist if and only if λ > 0, and thus, the last term of Eq. (17)
reflects collateral constraints. We statistically examine whether the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is
negative.11 The negative significant value of the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 implies that an econ-
omy faces a collateral constraint, and this collateral constraint impacts the current account.
Our objective is to examine whether the current account is aﬀected by domestic financial fric-
tions, so it suﬃces to test whether the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative, although we cannot
directly identify the value of λ. One should note that when λ is greater than zero, the eﬀect
of collateral constraints on the current account is magnified by country-specific variables
(Ψ) and (xˆ) given a discount factor (β). For robustness checks, we also construct the 95%
confidence intervals of the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 by applying semiparametric bootstrapping
in addition to performing the standard t test.12
III Data
We prepared an annual dataset of six Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. We assembled the data for each country for as long
a period as possible until 2007. We did not include the data from 2008 onward to avoid the
eﬀect of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 on the estimation. The initial year for each
country is diﬀerent due to data availability. To obtain data on the current account (CA)
and the net output (Z), we assembled the gross national product (GNP), the gross domestic
11As in the Kiyotaki and Moore model, land is used as collateral in our model. One might argue that
other assets could be used as collateral. For instance, asset-based lending to small firms associated with
inventories is becoming popular in the United States. Nevertheless, land is still commonly used as collateral
in many countries.
12One obvious feature of the Asian financial crisis is that the domestic interest rates spiked during the
crisis. Although Eq. (17) does not capture the super short-run interest rate variation, it captures the eﬀect
of collateral constraints in the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1.
12
product (GDP), aggregate consumption, aggregate investment (which is defined as the sum
of gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories), and government spending from
the database of International Financial Statistics, which was issued by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) on January 2011. All of these variables are deflated by the consumer
price index.
The data on the current account (CA) are computed as the GNP minus the sum of
aggregate consumption, aggregate investment, and government spending. The net output
(Z) is computed as GDP minus aggregate investment and government spending. We use
“total reserves minus gold” from the database of International Financial Statistics for the
foreign reserves (FR). The total reserves minus gold in the database are measured by the
local currency, so following the procedure employed by Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011), we
construct the real value of FR by using the nominal exchange rate and the consumer price
index. The data on private credit were collected from the database of the financial structure
created by the World Bank (2012). In the database, we have a variable entitled “private
credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP,” which is the private
credit/GDP ratio. To obtain the data for real private credit, PC, we multiply the real GDP
by the ratio.13
Although we used the ordinary least squares (OLS) method for the basic estimation
for Eq. (17), we are concerned about an endogeneity problem associated with ∆Zt. For
example, an increase in the demand for foreign investment may cause a decrease in domestic
investment that increases ∆Zt, implying that a reverse causality from CAt to ∆Zt could
appear. Alternatively, there may be omitted variables such as the aging of the population
that cannot be captured by Eq. (17) but that can certainly have an eﬀect on the current
account. As such, we also performed an instrumental variable (IV) estimation for Eq. (17)
to check the robustness of the results from the OLS estimation. We used two-period lagged
13We tested the stationarity of each variable. Based on the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test
and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992) test and based on the intertemporal feasibility constraint
of a country, we judge that all variables are stationary. The main results from the formal tests are provided
upon request.
13
aggregate investment and two-period lagged government spending as instrumental variables
for ∆Zt. These variables were assembled from the aforementioned database of International
Financial Statistics. In reality, production will take a certain gestation period and past
investment should have a positive impact on current production without correlating with
the current error term. Additionally, past government spending could be used to construct
infrastructure that increases the productivity of the entire economy without correlating with
the current error term. Considering realities, it is appropriate to use these variables as
instrumental variables for the net output (∆Zt).
IV Estimation Results
Benchmark Results
We estimated the current account dynamics given by Eq. (17). Following the convention, a
constant term is always included in our estimation, although we do not report the estimated
constant. The benchmark results on the six countries obtained from the OLS method are
presented in Table 1.
[Table 1 around here]
Indonesia. The estimated coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative and significant at the conven-
tional significance level for the one-sided test as predicted by our model. However, the 95%
confidence interval of the coeﬃcient includes zero. Therefore, we cannot robustly judge that
collateral constraints aﬀected the current account in the estimation period. The coeﬃcients
of CAt−1 and ∆Zt are positive as predicted by our model, but the impact of ∆Zt is insignif-
icant. The coeﬃcient of ∆FRt is positive as our model predicts, but it is insignificant.
Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. These three countries obtain a similar result: although
the coeﬃcients of CAt−1 and ∆Zt are positive and significant, the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is
positive, as opposed to our model prediction, or negative but insignificant. The coeﬃcients
of ∆FRt are positive, but they are insignificant in these countries.
The Philippines. The coeﬃcients of CAt−1 and ∆Zt are positive and significant, and the
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coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative and significant. As in the case of Indonesia, however,
the 95% confidence interval of the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 includes zero, and thus we cannot
robustly judge that collateral constraints aﬀected the current account during the estimation
period. The coeﬃcient of ∆FRt is insignificant, although it is positive.
Thailand. As predicted by our model, the coeﬃcients of CAt−1 and ∆Zt are positive and
significant. The coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is negative but insignificant. The coeﬃcient of ∆FRt
is negative and insignificant.
For any of these six countries, the benchmark results cannot confirm that collateral con-
straints matter to their current account dynamics throughout the estimation period. We
must be careful, however, in several respects when we interpret these results. The error term
of the estimation equation may be serially correlated as often occurs in time-series analyses.
We then tested whether there is serial correlation in the error term by using the Ljung-Box
Q test (Ljung and Box, 1978). The Q statistics of all six countries do not reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation.
In addition, as discussed in section III, ∆Zt may be an endogenous variable. We then
conduct a robustness check by estimating Eq. (17) using the IV technique. The results are
presented in Table 2, which shows that the patterns for the significance and signs of the
coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 for all countries except Indonesia are exactly the same as those in the
OLS results in Table 1.14 The coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 in Indonesia in the IV estimation is in-
significant, although it is negative. Moreover, the 95% confidence intervals of the coeﬃcients
of ∆PCt−1 for all six countries include zero. Finally, benchmark results are obtained from
the entire sample estimations. However, these cannot uncover the structural change in the
current account dynamics. As discussed in Bernanke’s (2005) global saving glut hypothe-
sis, it is highly likely that the pattern for the current account dynamics in Asian countries
changed from before and to after the financial crisis in 1997-1998. Motivated by the global
14Although in Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia, the patterns for the significance and signs of the coeﬃcient
of ∆Zt are diﬀerent from those in the OLS results, our interest is in the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1.
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saving glut hypothesis, we performed the F -test in the next section to determine if there is
a structural change in the current account dynamics.
[Table 2 around here]
Structural Change
We examined whether there was a structural change in the impact of∆PCt−1 before and after
the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis by applying the F -test. We searched for a structural
change only in the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1. We opened a test window from 1995 to 2000.
Figure 1 shows the F -values of the test for the structural change. As seen in the figure,
the F -values for all six countries are greater than the 10% significance level for at least
one year in the period 1997-2000. From the F -values in the figure, we judge that Korea,
Singapore, and Thailand had structural changes in 1997 in the pattern of the current account
dynamics, and Malaysia and the Philippines had structural changes in 1998. We judge that
the structural change in Indonesia occurred in 2000 because the F -value in 2000 is greater
than that in 1999.
[Figure 1 around here]
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the OLS estimations, dividing the data at
each breaking point. The comparison between Tables 1 and 3 is remarkable.
[Table 3 around here]
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land had an almost identical experience. Although Table 1 does not confirm that collateral
constraints aﬀected the current account dynamics in these countries throughout the esti-
mation period, Table 3 indicates that before the financial crisis, collateral constraints did
aﬀect the current account dynamics in these four countries, with the current account being
16
reduced by an increase in ∆PCt−1. The standard t tests for these countries reject the null
hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 is equal to zero and indicate that it is significantly
negative. Moreover, for these four countries, the 95% confidence intervals of the coeﬃcients
of ∆PCt−1 do not include zero in the estimations before the financial crisis.15 We provide
the bootstrap distributions of the coeﬃcients of ∆PCt−1 for these four countries in Figure
2. We note from the figure that none of the distributions skew. The coeﬃcients of CAt−1
and ∆Zt in these four countries are positive and significant before the financial crisis, as our
model predicts. Only in Malaysia is the coeﬃcient of ∆FRt significantly positive.
[Figure 2 around here]
We have confirmed that in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, both∆Zt and
∆PCt−1 significantly aﬀected the current account dynamics before the Asian financial crisis.
In this case, which variable contributes more to the determination of the current account?
It is interesting to investigate the relative importance of ∆Zt (which reflects traditional
consumption smoothing motives) and ∆PCt−1 (which reflects collateral constraints) for the
determination of the current account. Huetter and Sunder (2012) propose decomposing the
contributions of independent variables to R-squared, based on the Shapley value.16 The
application of the method proposed by Huetter and Sunder yields the following results for
each country. In Korea, the contribution of ∆Zt to the R-squared in the pre-crisis estimation
is 14.3% and that of ∆PCt−1 is 13.4%. In Malaysia, the contribution of ∆Zt is 13.9% and
that of ∆PCt−1 is 22.5%. In the Philippines, the contribution of ∆Zt is 10.2% and that
of ∆PCt−1 is 40.1%. In Thailand, the contribution of ∆Zt is 7.41% and that of ∆PCt−1
is 42.2%. These outcomes convince us that collateral constraints played a crucial role in
the current account dynamics before the financial crisis relative to traditional consumption
15Strictly speaking, the 95% confidence interval for Malaysia barely includes zero in the upper boundary
of the interval.
16See Huetter and Sunder (2012) for the detailed procedures of the decomposition. Heineck and Su¨ssmuth




Before the financial crisis, ∆PCt−1 has a significantly negative impact on the current
account dynamics, but after the crisis, the impact of ∆PCt−1 becomes null. Although the
post-crisis estimation results are untrustworthy because the sample size is too small, the
important point of our estimation results is the discovery of structural changes in these
four countries. Before the crisis, there were numerous capital inflows into Asian emerging
economies. According to Bernanke’s (2005) global saving glut hypothesis, these emerging
economies did not always use these numerous funds in a productive fashion; poorly devel-
oped banking systems in these economies allocated these funds to less productive investment
projects. Our empirical results obtained from estimations for Korea, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand show that credit booms before the crisis were associated with collateral
constraints. Credit booms ended when the crisis occurred and the investment demand in
these countries decreased. Capital began to flow out of these countries, mostly to the United
States, after the crisis. Bernanke’s hypothesis notes that in response to the financial crisis,
some governments in Asian countries, including those of Korea and Thailand, began to build
up large quantities of foreign currency reserves, intervening in the financial markets.17 Fur-
thermore, Bernanke suggests that the institutional weaknesses associated with developing
countries’ investment conditions, such as unsecured property rights, corruption, government
ineﬀectiveness, and financial underdevelopment, could explain why capital outflows went
directly to the United States.18 Based on Bernanke’s global saving glut hypothesis, we can
infer that massive capital outflow and the government’s intervention in the financial market
17In particular, the IMF immediately got the monetary and fiscal policies of Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand
under control after the financial crisis.
18Bernanke maintains that adequate financial and institutional development in Asian countries would
reduce the current account surplus of these countries. Applying the panel regression approach employed
by the pioneering work of Chinn and Prasad (2003), Chinn and Ito (2007) find evidence that is apparently
consistent with the global saving glut hypothesis, indicating that a fully developed financial sector in a
country can lead to a reduction in the current account balance provided that the country is endowed with a
fully developed legal system and an open financial market. However, they conclude that few Asian countries
are endowed with these types of legal systems and open markets, implying that most countries would actually
experience higher savings with greater financial development. Gruber and Kamin (2007) demonstrate that
the institutional-quality diﬀerence fails to explain the large current deficit of the United States. Therefore,
this part of the global saving glut hypothesis remains an open empirical question.
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perturbed collateral-based lending in these countries, and thus, the impact of ∆PCt−1 on
the current account dynamics becomes null after the crisis in our estimations.
Indonesia. The result for Indonesia is somewhat puzzling. Although the IMF controlled the
monetary and fiscal policies in Indonesia immediately after the financial crisis, as mentioned
in footnote 17, the standard t test in Table 3 shows that the collateral constraints aﬀected
the current account dynamics from 2000 to 2007. This result contrasts with those for Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As discussed by Hill and Shiraishi (2007) and Ito
(2007), Indonesia in 1997-1998 was involved not only in the financial crisis but also in a
political crisis with respect to the end of the Soeharto regime. Our estimation result might
reflect the political chaos at this time. Of course, this interpretation is tentative because
there are only 8 observations after the financial crisis and the 95% confidence interval of
the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 includes zero. In the period 1983-2000, the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1
is not significant, although it is negative. This means that it is unlikely that collateral
constraints in Indonesia aﬀected the current account before the financial crisis. However, as
seen in the robustness check using the closed-form solution for the current account derived
from the stochastic model in the next section, the coeﬃcient related to collateral constraints
is significant in the same period. So, we have mixed evidence regarding whether collateral
constraints in Indonesia aﬀected the current account before the crisis.
Singapore. Although the F -value in Figure 1 indicates Singapore’s structural change in
1997, the estimated coeﬃcients of ∆PCt−1 in both the pre- and post-crisis estimations are
positive, indicating that collateral constraints did not aﬀect the current account throughout
the estimation period. The 95% confidence intervals of the coeﬃcients of ∆PCt−1 in both
the pre- and post-crisis estimations include zero.
Remark on Estimated Coeﬃcients
Domestic collateral constraints significantly aﬀect the current account before the Asian fi-
nancial crisis in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and Kiyotaki and Moore’s
(1997) model can be applied to these four countries before the crisis. Given these out-
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comes, it is worthwhile considering the implication of the other estimated coeﬃcients on the
underlying structural parameters.
The coeﬃcient of ∆Zt in the closed-form solution is β, which is the subjective discount
factor. Many studies in the business cycles literature calibrate the subjective discount factor
as 0.99 assuming that one period is a quarter.19 In our estimations, one period is a year,
and thus β = 0.96 is a plausible value in the business cycles literature. The estimated
coeﬃcients of ∆Zt vary greatly from 0.029 (the period 1983-1999, Indonesia) to 1.078 (the
period 1997-2007, Thailand). However, nine cases (the period 2000-2007, Indonesia; the
period 1973-1996, Korea; the period 1997-2007, Korea; the period 1962-1997, Malaysia; the
period 1998-2007, the Philippines; the period 1969-1996, Singapore; the period, 1997-2007,
Singapore; the period 1968-1996, Thailand; the period 1997-2007, Thailand) out of twelve in
Table 3 do not reject the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of ∆Zt is not diﬀerent from 0.96
at the 10% significance level. The coeﬃcient of CAt−1 is βR, which is the subjective discount
factor multiplied by the gross world interest rate. The estimated coeﬃcients of CAt−1 also
vary greatly from 0.252 (the period 1983-1999, Indonesia) to 0.899 (the period 1962-1997,
Malaysia). Assume that the net real world interest rate is 2%, that is, R = 1.02. If β = 0.96,
it follows that βR = 0.98. Six cases in Table 3 (the period 2000-2007, Indonesia; the
period 1973-1996, Korea; the period 1962-1997, Malaysia; the period 1969-1996, Singapore;
the period 1997-2007, Singapore; the period 1997-2007, Thailand) do not reject the null
hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of CAt−1 is not diﬀerent from 0.98 at the 10% significance level.
Lastly, the coeﬃcient of ∆FRt is 1− β, which is computed as 0.04. Eight cases (the period
1983-1999, Indonesia; the period 1973-1996, Korea; the period 1997-2007, Korea; the period
1962-1997, Malaysia; the period 1998-2007, Malaysia; the period 1962-1997, Philippines;
the period 1969-1996, Singapore; the period 1997-2007, Singapore) do not reject the null
hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of ∆FRt is not diﬀerent from 0.04 at the 10% significance
level.
19See, for instance, Hansen (1985) and Christiano et al. (2005), among others.
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We note that before the financial crisis in Korea and Malaysia, all of the estimated coeﬃ-
cients of CAt−1, ∆Zt, and ∆FRt in Table 3 are statistically harmonious with those plausible
parameter values frequently used in the business cycles literature. Moreover, before the crisis
in these two countries, collateral constraints played a crucial role in the determination of the
current account as previously discussed. As such, our theoretical and empirical investigations
demonstrate that there are real cases in which Kiyotaki and Moore’s model with empirically
plausible parameter values performs very well when determining the current account.20
V Extension to a Stochastic Model
In this section, we extend the deterministic model in section II to a stochastic model and
derive a closed-form solution for the current account. We focus on the stationary state
in which all variables exhibit stationary distributions because the closed-form solution for
the current account on the stochastic transitional path includes unobservables such as the
expectations of future variables, and thus we cannot estimate the closed form. By assuming
that an economy is in the stationary state, these unobservables become constant and their
first diﬀerences are zero. Accordingly, we can derive a simple closed-form solution for the
current account without unobservable variables. The derivation of the closed-form solution
for the current account in the stochastic model is complicated, so the proof of Proposition
2 and the derivation of each equation are allocated to the online appendix. Although the
model setting is the same as in section II, we depart from the basic model in that borrows’
technology is subject to an aggregate shock in each period. Each borrower is endowed with
a linear production technology such as yt+1 = at+1xt, where at+1 is a random variable that
is independent and identically distributed across time (the i.i.d. assumption). The support
of at+1 is [a, a¯] for all t. The mean of at+1 is a, namely, Et(at+1) = a. All borrowers face the
20In the business cycles literature, although Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) show that Kiyotaki and Moore’s
(1997) model with empirically plausible parameter values leads to very weak amplification and propagation
mechanisms, Mendicino (2012) shows that if we explicitly take into consideration ineﬃciencies in debt en-
forcement, we find strong amplification mechanisms even under empirically plausible values for preference
and technology parameters.
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same productivity shock in each period.21
Borrowers
The utility maximization problem of a borrower is almost the same as that of the basic model
in section II except that at+1 and qt+1 are random variables when she makes a decision about
consumption and saving at time t. A borrower with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) solves the







s.t. cs + qs(xs − xs−1) + Rbs−1
= (1− τ)asxs−1 + bs, (19)
bs ≤ R−1Es(qs+1)xs, (20)
for s ≥ t. Diﬀering from Eq. (9), the credit constraint is associated with Es(qs+1). The
Euler equation of a borrower is given by
Et(ut)
ct
= β £(1− τ)a+ (1− τ)γ2t + γ1t ¤Et ∙ 1ct+1
¸
, (21)
where γ1t = Covt(qt+1, 1/ct+1)/Et(1/ct+1) and γ2t = Covt(at+1, 1/ct+1)/Et(1/ct+1).
Savers
The utility maximization problem of a saver also follows that of the basic model in section
II. A saver with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) solves the following maximization problem at
21The extension to a case in which savers also face productivity shocks is straightforward and obtains
essentially the same closed form solution for the current account. To save notations and for simplicity, we









s.t. c∗s + qs(x
∗
s − x∗s−1) + I∗s + Rb∗s−1
= (1− τ)[G1(x∗s−1) +G2(k∗s−1)] + b∗s, (23)


























where γt = Covt(qt+1, 1/c∗t+1)/Et(1/c∗t+1).
Equilibrium
From Eqs. (19) and (21), the borrower’s optimal consumption is obtained as follows:
ct = (1− β) [(1− τ)atxt−1 + [qt − Et−1(qt)]xt−1] . (27)
Depending on the stochastic productivity shocks, qt − Et−1(qt) could be negative. In what
follows, we assume that a is suﬃciently large so that the right-hand side of Eq. (27) is
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positive.22 From Eqs. (23)-(26), the saver’s optimal consumption is derived as follows:
c∗t = (1− β)
"






+ [(1− τ)yˆ∗ − δkˆ∗]/(R − 1) + γ˜t
#
. (28)











t−1) + (1 − τ)(G2(k∗t−1) − G02(k∗t−1))k∗t−1. From Eqs. (27) and (28), we can derive
a simple closed-form solution for the current account in the stationary state in which all
variables exhibit stationary distributions with the i.i.d. assumption for at because γt and γ˜t
are constant in the stationary state.
Proposition 2
The closed-form solution for the current account in the stationary state of the stochastic
economy is given as follows:
CAt = βR CAt−1 + (1− β)∆FRt + β∆Zt − (1− β)Ωλxˆ∆PCt, (29)
where Ω is a positive constant.
Proof: See the online appendix.
The diﬀerence between Eq. (17) and Eq. (29) is that although ∆PCt−1 is associated
with CAt in Eq. (17), ∆PCt is associated with CAt in Eq. (29). Eq. (17), derived
from the deterministic model, is applied when an economy is on a deterministic transitional
path to the steady-state equilibrium. In this case, the increase in qt relaxes the collateral
constraint at time t − 1 and directly induces an increase in bt−1 and thus PCt−1 (see Eq.
22We do not consider borrowers’ defaults. Our objective is to examine the performance of Kiyotaki
and Moore’s (1997) model and test whether borrowers in real economies face collateral constraints using
macroeconomic data, without specifying any hypothetical distribution regarding productivity shocks. As seen
in Eq. (27), to consider borrowers’ defaults, it is necessary to numerically derive a stationary distribution of
the land price from a hypothetical distribution of productivity shocks. This calibration procedure is beyond
the scope of this paper. The reader who is interested in studies on recent sovereign defaults in emerging
economies is referred to Arellano (2008).
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(9)). Then, as discussed in section II, each constrained borrower invests more in land at
time t− 1 and consumes more at time t. Because unconstrained savers do not change their
consumption and saving plan, aggregate consumption at time t increases, and thus we can
derive the negative relationship between CAt and ∆PCt−1 in the deterministic model. By
contrast, the mechanism through which the negative relationship between CAt and ∆PCt
occurs in the stationary state of the stochastic model is completely diﬀerent. Consider a
case in which borrowers experience a high productivity shock at time t. In this case, each
constrained borrower’s demand for land (xt) increases, and thus the land price at time t (qt)
increases. Because the credit constraint (20) is relaxed by an increase in xt, bt and thus PCt
increase even though Et(qt+1) in the credit constraint is constant in the stationary state.
Accordingly, we can observe the positive relationship between ∆qt and ∆PCt. From Eq.
(21) with ut = qt − qt+1/R, it is noted that an increase in qt induces more consumption
from borrowers at time t in the stationary state. As such, aggregate consumption at time
t increases because of an increase in qt, and thus, we can derive the negative relationship
between CAt and ∆PCt in the stationary state of the stochastic model.
Robustness checks
In reality, we do not know whether an economy is on the deterministic transitional path as
investigated in section II, on the stochastic transitional path (for which we cannot estimate
the closed-form solution because of the unobservable variables), or in the stochastic station-
ary state as investigated in this section. For robustness checks, therefore, we estimate Eq.
(29) and produce estimation results comparable to those in Table 3. As seen in Table 4, the
results regarding collateral constraints (namely, the coeﬃcients of ∆PCt) are similar to those
in Table 3 with some exceptions. Although the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt in Korea for the period
1997-2007 is significant in contrast with that in Table 3, the post-crisis estimation results
are untrustworthy because of the small sample size. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval
of the coeﬃcient definitely includes zero. Therefore, the result in Table 4 for the eﬀect of
collateral constraints on the current account in Korea is tentative for the period 1997-2007.
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We judge that after the financial crisis, the impact of ∆PCt on the current account becomes
null in Korea. Regarding Indonesia, the estimation result in the period 1983-1999 in Table 4
diﬀers from that in Table 3. The coeﬃcient of ∆PCt in Table 4 is significant for the period
1983-1999, and the 95% confidence interval of the coeﬃcient does not include zero for the
same period. Judging from the results in Tables 3 and 4, there is mixed evidence regarding
the impact of collateral constraints on the current account before the crisis in Indonesia.
[Table 4 around here]
VI DISCUSSION
The current paper relates to the literature on the intertemporal current account (ICA) ap-
proach. The ICA approach has been the dominant theoretical framework for investigating
the determinants of the current account dynamics over the last three decades. Early influ-
ential papers such as Sachs (1981), Obstfeld (1982), and Johnson (1986) led to wide use of
the ICA approach to study the current account dynamics. According to the ICA approach,
current account imbalances are an outcome of optimal intertemporal saving and investment
decisions (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995). Most empirical studies in this literature use Campbell
and Shiller’s (1987) methodology to derive a directly estimable closed-form solution for the
current account dynamics. Typical empirical studies along this line include Sheﬀrin and Woo
(1990), Milbourne and Otto (1992), Otto (1992), and Ghosh (1995). Generally speaking,
the empirical fits for these simple ICA models are relatively poor, and subsequent authors
have improved the models in various directions. Some endogenize investment dynamics, sep-
arating them from output dynamics, and others incorporate time-varying interest rates. In
these studies, many researchers focus on the eﬀects from global and country-specific shocks
and/or permanent and temporary shocks on the current account. As demonstrated by Glick
and Rogoﬀ (1995) and Razin (1995), a global shock does not impact the current account
because agents in a small open economy are uninsured against a global shock and their con-
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sumption cannot be optimally smoothed. However, a country-specific shock does aﬀect the
current account because agents mitigate the eﬀects of the shock by adjusting their optimal
consumption and saving behavior through the international financial markets. By deriving
a closed-form current account solution, Kano (2008) examines the response of the current
account to three diﬀerent shocks–global, country-specific permanent, and country-specific
transitory shocks–and discovers that consumption-tilting factors are crucial for explaining
the current account movements in Canada and the United Kingdom.23
Moreover, applying Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) methodology, Shibata and Shintani
(1998) and Bussie`re et al. (2010) introduce into the ICA model agents who cannot access
international financial markets. Considering country-specific shocks to net output, Shibata
and Shintani (1998) derive an explicit solution for the current account dynamics and estimate
the dynamics for 11 countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD). They find evidence showing the existence of international financial market
imperfections for Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States among
the 11 countries. Bussie`re et al. (2010) obtain an estimable current account equation in the
presence of global, productivity, and budget deficit shocks. Estimating the equation, they
investigate the response of the current account to these shocks for the 21 OECD member
countries.
Although the empirical literature on the ICA approach has investigated the eﬀects from
various shocks on the current account, few researchers have explicitly focused on the eﬀects
of domestic financial frictions. Kasa (1998) and Kunieda and Shibata (2005) are notable
exceptions.24 Kasa extends Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model to a small open economy and
derives closed-form solutions to the land price and the current account dynamics. Estimating
these dynamics for Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong, Kasa finds that the degree of credit
23See Ghosh (1995), Kano (2008), and Braeu (2010) for details on consumption-tilting factors.
24Recently, some researchers such as Adam et al. (2012), Punzi (2013), and Ferrero (2015) study current
account imbalances in an economy with financial frictions that are associated with housing markets. Diﬀering
from the traditional ICA approach, they use calibration to measure the impacts of financial frictions on the
current account.
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constraint is quite severe in these countries. Based on Kasa’s model, Kunieda and Shibata
develop a small open economy version of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model to derive a
closed-form current account solution in a collaterally constrained economy. Their closed-
form solution is associated with the first diﬀerence in land prices: if land prices increase
from time t− 1 to t, the current account decreases at time t because of the relaxation of the
collateral constraints. Using data on the Japanese economy, the authors estimate the current
account dynamics in the Japanese economy and conclude that the Japanese economy was
collaterally constrained from 1959 to 2001.
Kunieda and Shibata’s (2005) closed-form current account solution is so simple that we
can directly estimate the current account dynamics. However, we must prepare the land
price data for the estimation, and there are relatively few countries for which we can collect
land price data over a long period. Additionally, the quality of land price data is often poor:
if we try to assemble the data, we would likely be driven to using a “house price index” as
a proxy for the land price in many countries. In contrast to Kunieda and Shibata (2005),
we derived two new closed-form solutions for the current account: one is associated with the
one-period-lagged first diﬀerence in private credit in the deterministic model and the other is
associated with the current-period first diﬀerence in private credit in the stochastic model.
The private credit data are available in most countries over a long period and are reliable.
Therefore, the newly derived closed-form current account solution associated with private
credit benefits us.
VII Concluding Remarks
We applied a small open economy version of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model to derive
a closed-form solution for the current account dynamics. By using the closed-form solution,
we examined the performance of Kiyotaki and Moore’s (1997) model and investigated how
collateral constraints impact the current account dynamics in Asian countries before and
after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998. If the coeﬃcient of ∆PCt−1 in Eq. (17) is
significantly negative, the Kiyotaki and Moore model is statistically accepted for a country,
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and we consider domestic financial frictions to aﬀect the current account dynamics in the
country. The entire sample analysis cannot uncover the structural change in the coeﬃcient
of the one-period-lagged first diﬀerence in private credit, which is an indicator of the impact
of collateral constraints. Therefore, we conducted an F -test for the structural change and
estimated the current account dynamics, dividing the data at the breaking point of the
structural change. Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have an almost identical
experience with respect to the current account dynamics before and after the financial crisis:
our estimations demonstrated that collateral constraints significantly aﬀected the current
account dynamics before the financial crisis in these four countries but that after the crisis,
collateral constraints had no eﬀect on the current account. We, furthermore, derived a closed-
form solution for the current account from the stochastic model and estimated the equation.
We obtain similar results to those from the estimation of the deterministic model. Our study
provides researchers and policymakers with a new perspective with regard to financial crises
in the era of globalization in that it clarifies how the impact of domestic financial frictions
on the current account dynamics changes before and after a financial crisis.
In this paper, we have focused on estimations of the current account dynamics. However,
there is another dynamic equation that can be directly estimated in our model: Eq. (A3)
in the online appendix. Eq. (A3) is a closed-form solution for the consumption dynamics.
In particular, the second term of the right-hand side represents the wealth eﬀect of land
holdings, and this term can be rewritten in terms of the one-period-lagged first diﬀerence
in private credit. We can investigate the consumption dynamics in economies with financial
frictions but leave this empirical question for future research.
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Country Period CAt¡1 ¢FRt ¢Zt ¢PCt¡1 (¢PCt¡1) R2
Indonesia 1983-2007 0.408** 0.010 0.241 -0.161** [-0.491, 0.168] 0.41
(0.230) (0.027) (0.244) (0.091)
Korea 1973-2007 0.500*** 0.060 0.644** -0.097 [-0.550, 0.355] 0.66
(0.115) (0.047) (0.304) (0.219)
Malaysia 1962-2007 0.854*** 0.023 0.897*** 0.056 [-0.172, 0.284] 0.95
(0.065) (0.125) (0.251) (0.109)
Philippines 1962-2007 0.913*** 0.010 0.698*** -0.098* [-0.243, 0.047] 0.97
(0.029) (0.008) (0.107) (0.065)
Singapore 1969-2007 0.863*** 0.003 1.041*** 0.198 [-0.037, 0.433] 0.98
(0.064) (0.158) (0.100) (0.094)
Thailand 1968-2007 0.923*** -0.045 1.125*** -0.055 [-0.207, 0.096] 0.87
(0.159) (0.029) (0.229) (0.059)
Notes: The dependent variable is the current account, CAt. All estimations include constant terms, although we do
not report the estimated constants here. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels,
respectively, for the one-sided tests. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 95%
con¯dence interval (CI) of the coe±cient of ¢PCt¡1 is computed based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions.
TABLE 2
IV Estimation
95%CI First-stage Hansen test LM test
Country Period CAt¡1 ¢FRt ¢Zt ¢PCt¡1 (¢PCt¡1) F-value (p-value) (p-value)
Indonesia 1983-2007 0.258 0.043 -0.173 -0.143 [-0.749, 0.463] 4.99 0.64 0.34
(0.261) (0.039) (0.246) (0.118)
Korea 1973-2007 0.488*** 0.061* 0.593 -0.079 [-1.031, 0.872] 5.18 0.77 0.14
(0.103) (0.044) (0.581) (0.249)
Malaysia 1962-2007 1.008*** 0.167 0.007 0.276 [-0.871, 1.422] 3.27 0.92 0.97
(0.093) (0.139) (0.434) (0.253)
Philippines 1962-2007 0.892*** 0.008 0.786*** -0.109** [-0.286, 0.068] 10.72 0.50 0.00
(0.028) (0.007) (0.094) (0.063)
Singapore 1969-2007 0.849*** -0.011 1.109*** 0.210 [-0.109, 0.530] 15.54 0.43 0.00
(0.067) (0.159) (0.238) (0.099)
Thailand 1968-2007 0.916*** -0.044 1.076*** -0.054 [-0.339, 0.231] 10.21 0.07 0.13
(0.153) (0.030) (0.298) (0.056)
Notes: The dependent variable is the current account, CAt. All estimations include constant terms, although we do not
report the estimated ones. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively, for the
one-sided tests. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 95% con¯dence interval
(CI) of the coe±cient of ¢PCt¡1 is computed based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions. The instrumental variables for
¢Ztare the two-period-lagged aggregate investment and the two-period-lagged government expenditure. The Hansen tests
of overidentifyng restrictions do not reject the orthogonality conditions in all estimations. The LM tests are robust to weak
instruments and the p-values are associated with the signi¯cance of the coe±cient of¢Zt. See Finlay and Magnusson (2009)
for more information on the LM test.
TABLE 3
OLS Estimation Before and After the Financial Crisis
95%CI
Country Period CAt¡1 ¢FRt ¢Zt ¢PCt¡1 (¢PCt¡1) R2
Indonesia 1983-1999 0.252 0.059 0.029 -0.228 [-0.788, 0.331] 0.19
(0.368) (0.077) (0.427) (0.207)
2000-2007 0.522** -0.053 0.559* -0.350** [-2.114, 1.414] 0.86
(0.205) (0.027) (0.253) (0.107)
Korea 1973-1996 0.814*** 0.038 0.706*** -0.636*** [-0.893, -0.378] 0.83
(0.121) (0.053) (0.189) (0.097)
1997-2007 0.333 0.041 0.650 0.025 [-13.864, 13.915] 0.29
(0.234) (0.064) (0.693) (0.363)
Malaysia 1962-1997 0.899*** 0.101* 0.704*** -0.129*** [-0.259, 0.000] 0.81
(0.121) (0.063) (0.165) (0.028)
1998-2007 0.792*** 0.009 0.481** 0.463 [-4.642, 5.568] 0.95
(0.088) (0.109) (0.213) (0.168)
Philippines 1962-1997 0.630*** 0.018 0.444** -0.243** [-0.486, -0.001] 0.71
(0.202) (0.017) (0.207) (0.104)
1998-2007 0.876*** -0.003 0.869*** -0.012 [-34.930, 34.905] 1.00
(0.024) (0.005) (0.176) (0.020)
Singapore 1969-1996 0.763*** -0.056 0.936*** 0.273 [-0.017, 0.562] 0.97
(0.128) (0.264) (0.116) (0.121)
1997-2007 0.875*** 0.171 1.043*** 0.354 [-10.428, 11.135] 0.95
(0.128) (0.272) (0.147) (0.210)
Thailand 1968-1996 0.689*** -0.040 0.713*** -0.176*** [-0.279, -0.072] 0.94
(0.101) (0.019) (0.169) (0.033)
1997-2007 0.866** -0.037 1.078** 0.004 [-1.017, 1.026] 0.68
(0.333) (0.035) (0.400) (0.089)
Notes: The dependent variable is the current account, CAt. All estimations include constant terms, although we do
not report the estimated constants here. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels,
respectively, for the one-sided tests. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 95%
con¯dence interval (CI) of the coe±cient of ¢PCt¡1 is computed based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions.
TABLE 4
OLS Estimation Before and After the Financial Crisis (Robustness)
95%CI
Country Period CAt¡1 ¢FRt ¢Zt ¢PCt (¢PCt) R2
Indonesia 1983-1999 -0.464 0.075* -0.260 -0.357*** [-0.704, -0.010] 0.64
(0.210) (0.050) (0.225) (0.085)
2000-2007 0.649** -0.086 0.814*** -0.728*** [-5.489, 4.033] 0.95
(0.167) (0.024) (0.113) (0.084)
Korea 1973-1996 0.932*** 0.004 0.803*** -0.647*** [-0.908, -0.386] 0.89
(0.085) (0.035) (0.140) (0.091)
1997-2007 0.303 0.073* 1.015* -0.560** [-5.276, 4.155] 0.52
(0.250) (0.050) (0.634) (0.225)
Malaysia 1962-1997 0.818*** 0.154* 0.756*** -0.136*** [-0.274, 0.001] 0.80
(0.131) (0.102) (0.151) (0.048)
1998-2007 0.628*** -0.002 0.689** 0.371 [-2.740, 3.481] 0.86
(0.111) (0.223) (0.280) (0.411)
Philippines 1962-1997 0.611*** 0.024* 0.458*** -0.296*** [-0.459, -0.133] 0.81
(0.151) (0.016) (0.150) (0.062)
1998-2007 0.862*** -0.002 0.877*** 0.084 [-3.126, 3.294] 1.00
(0.050) (0.005) (0.162) (0.194)
Singapore 1969-1996 0.799*** -0.016 0.882*** 0.136 [-0.099, 0.371] 0.96
(0.113) (0.270) (0.146) (0.111)
1997-2007 0.786** 0.225 0.968*** 0.286 [-4.315, 4.887] 0.94
(0.223) (0.276) (0.252) (0.214)
Thailand 1968-1996 0.758*** -0.020 0.775*** -0.178*** [-0.294, -0.062] 0.94
(0.093) (0.021) (0.174) (0.045)
1997-2007 0.725*** -0.027 1.093*** -0.106 [-0.570, 0.359] 0.74
(0.191) (0.034) (0.308) (0.086)
Notes: The dependent variable is the current account, CAt. All estimations include constant terms, although we do
not report the estimated constants here. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels,
respectively, for the one-sided tests. The numbers in parentheses are the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The 95%
con¯dence interval (CI) of the coe±cient of ¢PCt is computed based on 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions.
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Notes: Each of the F-values is calculated under the null hypothesis that the coe±cient of¢PCt¡1is not structurally changed
after a given year. The long- and short-dash lines indicate the 5% and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively.
FIGURE 2
Bootstrapping Distributions of the Coe±cient of ¢PCt¡1
Notes: The distributions are created from 10,000 bootstrapping repetitions.
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A. Proof of Proposition 1
To derive the current account dynamics, we aggregate the consumption functions over all of
the agents. From Eqs. (12), (13), and (16) the aggregate consumption function is given by
the following:




where Ct = ¸ct + (1 ¡ ¸)c¤t , Zt = ¸yt + (1 ¡ ¸)y¤t ¡ gt ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)I¤t , and Ft¡1 ¡ FRt¡1 =
¡(¸bt¡1+(1¡¸)b¤t¡1). Here, Ft¡1 is the net foreign assets held by the country at time t¡ 1.
The ¯rst di®erence of Eq. (A.1) is obtained as follows:











where x^¤ is the land held by a saver in the steady state. By using this equation, Eq. (A.2)
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is reduced to
¢Ct = (1¡ ¯)[¢Zt + ( ¹X ¡ (1¡ ¸)x^¤)¢qt +R¢Ft¡1 ¡¢FRt]: (A.3)
Meanwhile, it follows from the national income identity that1
CAt = RCAt¡1 +¢Zt ¡¢Ct; (A.4)
where CAt = ¢Ft is the current account at time t. From Eqs. (A.3) and (A.4), we obtain a
dynamic equation with respect to the current account:
CAt = ¯R CAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)¢FRt + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)( ¹X ¡ (1¡ ¸)x^¤)¢qt: (A.5)
Linearizing Rbt = qt+1xt around the steady state, we have
R(bt ¡ b^) = x^(qt+1 ¡ q^) + q^(xt ¡ x^):
By taking the ¯rst di®erence of this equation, it follows that
R¢bt = x^¢qt+1 + q^¢xt: (A.6)
Because ¹X = ¸xt + (1¡ ¸)x¤t , Eq. (A.5) becomes
CAt = ¯RCAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)R¢FRt¡1 + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)¸x^¢qt: (A.7)
From Eqs. (4), (14), and (16), we have G01(( ¹X ¡ ¸xt)=(1 ¡ ¸))xt = R¯axt¡1. By lin-
earizing this equation around the steady state, we have xt ¡ x^ = ©(xt¡1 ¡ x^), where











From Eq. (4), we have (1 ¡ ¿)G01
¡
( ¹X ¡ ¸xt)=(1¡ ¸)
¢
= Rqt ¡ qt+1, which is expanded




1(xt ¡ x^) = R(qt ¡ q^)¡ (qt+1 ¡ q^);
where G^001 = G
00
1(x^
¤). From this, we obtain





By substituting Eq. (A.8) into Eq. (A.9), we have










¡ ¸~©)©Rt¡1 + ¸~©©t; (A.11)
where ~© = (1 ¡ ¿)G^001¢x1= [(1¡ ¸)(©2 ¡R©)]. It must hold that ¢q1 = ¸~©© so that the
transversality condition can be satis¯ed. Therefore, we obtain
¢qt = ¸~©©
t: (A.12)
From Eqs. (A.9) and (A.12), we have ¢xt = ¢x1=(¸~©©
2)¢qt+1. From the latter equation
3





Substituting Eq. (A.13) into Eq. (A.7), we obtain
CAt = ¯RCAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)¢FRt + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)¸2ªx^¢bt¡1; (A.14)
where ª := R~©©2=(¸~©©2x^ + q^¢x1). Because the increase in loans to each borrower con-
tributes to the increase in aggregate private credit, we have ¸¢bt := ¢PCt. By substituting
this equation into (A.14), we obtain
CAt = ¯RCAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)¢FRt + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)ª¸x^¢PCt¡1: ¤
B. Binding Credit Constraints
The claim that there exists T such that from time T onwards, Eq. (9) is always binding is
proven taking two steps. Step 1 claims that each borrower faces a credit constraint at least
once over her lifetime. Step 2 claims that if a borrower faces a credit constraint at time T ,
then the credit constraints are binding from T onward.
First, step 1 is proven by contradiction. Suppose that Eq. (9) is never binding. Then,
Át = 0 for all t ¸ 0, and thus the Euler equation for a borrower becomes
ct+1 = ¯Rct; (B.1)
and the dynamic equation for the land price is given by
qt+1 = Rqt ¡ a(1¡ ¿): (B.2)
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From this equation, Eq. (4) is reduced to
G01(x
¤
t ) = a;
which implies that both xt and x
¤
t are constant. Then, the borrower's budget constraint (8)
becomes
ct +Rbt¡1 = a(1¡ ¿)~x+ bt; (B.3)
where ~x := ¹X=¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)G0¡11 (a)=¸. From Eqs. (B.1) and (B.3) and the transversality







where c0 is the initial value of consumption. Because ¯ < 1 and R¯ < 1, bt is increasing
and converges to a(1 ¡ ¿)~x=(R ¡ 1). However, this result is a contradiction because the
right-hand side of Eq. (9) is equal to a(1¡ ¿)~x=R(R¡ 1) < a(1¡ ¿)~x=(R¡ 1).
Next, we will show step 2. Suppose that the claim of step 2 does not hold. More
concretely, suppose that Eq. (9) is not binding at time t when it is binding at time t¡ 1. In





ct+1 = ¯Rct; (B.5)
which implies that ut becomes constant and is given by ~u := (1 ¡ ¿)a=R. From Eq. (4),
x¤t and xt are constant and given by ~x
¤ := G0¡11 (a) and ~x := ¹X=¸ ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)G0¡11 (a)=¸,
5
respectively.
Because the ¯rst equality of Eq. (16) holds whether Eq. (9) is binding or not, it follows
from Eq. (16), Eq. (B.5) and qt+1 = Rqt ¡ (1¡ ¿)a that bt = qt~x¡ ¯a(1¡ ¿)xt¡1. From the
last, however, we have
Rbt ¡ qt+1~x = (¸~x¡ ¯R¸xt¡1)(1¡ ¿)a=¸
> (¸~x¡ ¯R ¹X)(1¡ ¿)a=¸
=
£
(1¡ ¯R) ¹X=(1¡ ¸)¡G0¡11 (a)
¤
(1¡ ¿)(1¡ ¸)a=¸ > 0;
where the last inequality comes from Eq. (6). This result is a contradiction. From mathe-
matical induction, we have a desired conclusion. ¤
C. Proof of Proposition 2 and Related Equations
C.1. Derivations of Related Equations
To exclude economically meaningless solutions, we impose technical conditions similar to
Eq. (6): a > R¯a > G01
¡
(1¡R¯) ¹X=(1¡ ¸)¢ and assume that Eq. (20) is binding as in
section II.


















































= xt¡1 £ (1¡ ¿)at + qt ¡ Et¡1(qt)
ct
: (C.2)

























From Eq. (C.4) and the transversality condition, we obtain
Et(ut)xt(1¡ ¯) = ¯ct: (C.5)
It follows from Eqs. (C.2) and (C.5) that
ct = (1¡ ¯) [(1¡ ¿)atxt¡1 + [qt ¡ Et¡1(qt)]xt¡1] : (C.6)
Eq. (C.6) is rewritten as
ct = (1¡ ¯) [(1¡ ¿)atxt¡1 + qtxt¡1 ¡Rbt¡1] : (C.7)
This equation is Eq. (27).






where wt = qt ¡ (qt+1 + °t)=R. Likewise, the intra-temporal optimality condition in the
capital market is given by
(1¡ ¿)G02(k¤t ) = R + ± ¡ 1: (C.9)





We will use this equation later on. Before deriving the consumption function of a saver, we
de¯ne the steady state of this stochastic model, which is used when linearizing the model.
From Eqs. (C.5), (C.6), and (C.8), it follows that
·
(1¡ ¿)G01





xt = ¯R [(1¡ ¿)at + qt ¡ Et¡1(qt)]xt¡1











= ¯R(1¡ ¿)axt¡1: (C.11)
From Eq. (C.8), it follows that
(1¡ ¿)G01
µ ¹X ¡ ¸xt
1¡ ¸
¶
+ °t = REt(ut) (C.12)
where
ut = qt ¡ qt+1
R
: (C.13)
From Eqs. (C.11)-(C.13), the steady state values of xt, ut, and qt with Et(at) = a are given
8
by x^, u^, and q^ such that
¯R(1¡ ¿)a = Et¡1
·µ
(1¡ ¿)G01














µ ¹X ¡ ¸x^
1¡ ¸
¶








where °^ is °t's value when the economy is in the stationary state, which is constant because
all variables exhibit stationary distributions. Note that x^, u^, and q^ are elements of the
stationary state in this stochastic model. When linearizing the model, we do it around the
steady state that we have derived.
















where ~¼t¡1 = (1¡ ¿)(G1(x¤t¡1) ¡ G01(x¤t¡1)x¤t¡1) + (1¡ ¿)(G2(k¤t¡1) ¡ G02(k¤t¡1)k¤t¡1). Taking
















(1¡ ¿)G01(x¤t¡1)x¤t¡1 + (Et¡1(qt) + °t¡1)x¤t¡1
+(1¡ ¿)G02(k¤t¡1)k¤t¡1 + (1¡ ±)k¤t¡1 ¡Rb¤t¡1 + ~¼t¡1
¤









































t ¡ b¤t )=c¤t . By applying the law of iterated expectations to Eq. (C.14),
it follows that
Jt = ¯ + ¯











































































































































Therefore, Jt can be rewritten as
Jt = ¯ + ¯





















t+s]. Assuming that lims!1 ~°t(s) = ~°t,
the transversality condition lims!1 ¯






























From Eqs. (23) and (C.17), it follows that
c¤t = (1¡ ¯)
"












































+ [(1¡ ¿)y^¤ ¡ ±k^¤]=(R¡ 1):
2We use the same notation ¼t+j as in Eq. (13) in section II, although wt+j is applied in ¼t+j in Eq.
(C.19) for simplicity.
11
By inserting this equation into Eq. (C.18), we obtain
c¤t = (1¡ ¯)
"







+ [(1¡ ¿)y^¤ ¡ ±k^¤]=(R¡ 1) + ~°t
#
:
which is Eq. (28).
C.2. Aggregation
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, Eqs. (27) and (28) yield aggregate consumption as
follows:
Ct = (1¡ ¯)
"







+ (1¡ ¸)[(1¡ ¿)y^¤ ¡ ±k^¤]=(R¡ 1) + (1¡ ¸)~°t
#
: (C.20)
We obtain the ¯rst di®erence of Eq. (C.20) as follows:
¢Ct = (1¡ ¯)
"















and ¢~°t. Therefore, we cannot estimate Eq. (C.21). However, in the stationary state where






0 because °t and ~°t are constant. In what follows, we assume that the economy is in the
stationary state. In this case, we obtain exactly the same equation as Eq. (A.7) from Eqs.
12
(A.4) and (C.21) as follows:
CAt = ¯RCAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)¢FRt¡1 + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)¸x^¢qt: (C.22)
C.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Linearizing Rbt = Et(qt+1)xt around the steady state, we have
R(bt ¡ b^) = x^(Et(qt+1)¡ q^) + q^(xt ¡ x^t):
By taking the ¯rst di®erence of this equation, it follows that
R¢bt = x^¢Et(qt+1) + q^¢xt: (C.23)
Because ¢Et(qt+1) = 0 in the stationary state, Eq. (C.23) turns into
R¢bt = q^¢xt: (C.24)




1(xt ¡ x^) = R(qt ¡ q^)¡ Et(qt+1)¡ q^:
By taking the ¯rst di®erence of this equation, it follows that





Because ¢Et(qt+1) = 0 in the stationary state, Eq. (C.25) turns into




From Eqs. (C.24) and (C.26), we obtain
¢qt = ­¸¢bt;
where ­ := ¡(1¡ ¿)G^001=[(1¡ ¸)q^] > 0. Because ¸¢bt = ¢PCt, the last equation becomes
¢qt = ­¢PCt: (C.27)
From Eqs. (C.22) and (C.27), it follows that
CAt = ¯RCAt¡1 + (1¡ ¯)¢FRt¡1 + ¯¢Zt ¡ (1¡ ¯)¸x^­¢PCt: ¤
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